Ethicists of belief who are not value monists often claim that thereis a way of ordering norms or types of norms in terms of the relativestrength or relative ease with which their claims on us can bedefeated. This means that in a given situation there will be adeterminate answer about what one ought to believe “all thingsconsidered.” Others argue, however, that at least some of thenorms are incommensurable, and that in many cases there will simply beno answer to the question of what it is right to believe all thingsconsidered (Feldman 2000). Still others think that one category ofnorm collapses into another and that this can give us an all thingsconsidered conclusion (for discussion of whether epistemic rationalitycollapses into prudential rationality, for example, see Kelly2003)
Someone might suggest that the patient's knowledge that his“faith helps create the fact” itself counts as akind of evidence in its favor. If this is right, then the case wouldnot be in tension with Clifford's Principle after all. But other casescan be used to make the same point: Pascal famously argues that it isrequired by prudential rationality that we believe in God,even though we lack sufficient evidence for that belief, and eventhough such belief would play no role in “creating” thefact that it describes (Pascal 1670).
An essay on belief and acceptance (eBook, 1995) …
While a scientific approach can be adopted to look into the laws of nature for attempting to obtain knowledge in a sense that such knowledge entails the acceptance of a particular idea. There is another theory, on the other hand, which entails the belief of a particular idea with respect to a set of given experimental data. These varied concepts of knowledge attempt to resolve the conflict regarding the nature of the guarantee a person must possess so that it may indeed be declared that this person has knowledge of the notion. Holism, in this case, may be better related to acceptance, and the loss of belief is not to be associated with scepticism. This chapter looks into whether belief and acceptance affect the expansion of scientific knowledge.
Belief vs Acceptance: Why do people not believe in evolution?
A final alternative for the fideist is to admit that he is not reallyfocused on belief at all, but is rather trying to make room foranother kind of positive propositional attitude that is not guided byevidence. Many philosophers and religious people who embrace thefideist label construe “faith” (Latin: fides) assomething different from belief—hope, perhaps, or something like“acceptance” (see §7 and the entry on ). On such a conception, faith that p might very well be ablerationally to co-exist in the same psychology with a lot of evidencefor not-p.
This essay examines why people do not ..
A convenient label that captures both broadly pragmatist and broadlyKantian theories is Practical Non-Evidentialism, where thepragmatic/prudential and the moral are the two main species of“practical” value (for more on moral reasons for beliefand whether they count as evidence see Pace 2010; for a survey of thedebate about pragmatic reasons for belief see Reisner 2017).
College paper: Belief Versus Acceptance
I suggested earlier that a natural place to draw the line betweenmoderate Evidentialists and Non-Evidentialists about a domain ofbeliefs rests on the question of whether belief on the basis ofinsufficient evidence is ever reasonably required. Are weever obliged to believe, even in the absence of sufficient evidence?Strict and moderate Evidentialists will say no, Non-Evidentialistswill say yes. Naturally, the reasons that motivate this putativerequirement will be different according to different types ofNon-Evidentialism. Here the focus will be on the three main types ofNon-Evidentialism that are prevalent among contemporary philosophers:Practical Non-Evidentialism (which includes what is sometimes called“pragmatism”), Conservativism, and Fideism.