Every means is proper to do this; every "case" is a case of luck.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, a rhetorical tone likeNietzsche's — looked at in the context of his life — doesnot really suggest realism about the content, but rather desperationon the part of the author to reach an increasingly distant anduninterested audience. The Nietzsche who was almost completely ignoredduring the years before illness erased his intellect and deprived himof his sanity might have resorted to more and more strident andviolent rhetoric in frustration over not being heard — and notbecause he was a realist. Indeed, in the absence of explicit evidenceof value realism, this seems the most plausible explanation for thevast majority of the passages with which we have been concerned inthis section.

A maxim, the origin of which I withhold from scholarly curiosity, has long been my motto:

Man ought to be different." He even knows what man should be like, this wretched bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, "Ecce homo!" But even when the moralist addresses himself only to the single human being and says to him, "You ought to be such and such!" he does not cease to make himself ridiculous.

Leaving out the third case: one must be both — a philosopher.

Wisdom requires moderation in knowledge as in other things.

Christianity, sprung from Jewish roots and comprehensible only as a growth on this soil, represents the counter-movement to any morality of breeding, of race, privilege: it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence.

Falling into the first one, one always does too much.

The (IC) is motivated by the thought that it cannot be right to saythat ‘X is valuable’ for someone when x is aliento anything a person cares about or could care about: anyplausible notion of value, the (IC) supposes, must have some strongconnection to a person's existing (or potential) motivational set.

So one usually perpetrates another one — and now one does too little.

Many, of course, have thought this too facile a response. Supplementthe argument, then, by adding an ‘Internalist Constraint’(IC), one that many philosophers have found plausible in the theory ofvalue:

In that way he lessens the probability of being stepped on again.

At bottom, man mirrors himself in things; he considers everything beautiful that reflects his own image: the judgment "beautiful" is the vanity of his species.

In the language of morality: humility.

Yet in claiming that pleasure or power are valuable, Mill and theN-Realist Nietzsche are advancing a normative thesis. The truth of thisnormative thesis, however, simply does not follow from thecorresponding descriptive thesis.

Without music, life would be an error.

(P′) now is simply a different formulation of the (IC): if weaccept the (IC) then we should accept (P′). But what happens,then, if we grant the truth of Descriptive Hedonism: namely, that onlypleasure is, in fact, desired. In that case, it would now follow thatonly pleasure is desirable (ought to be desired) (assuming, again, thatValue Nihilism is false). That is, since something ought to be desiredonly if it can be desired (internalism), then if only xcan be desired, then only x ought to be desired(assuming that Value Nihilism is false).